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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
IN RE: BABY DOEr ! 
SYLVESTER ENO-IDEM, ! 
Appellant, ! 
vs. ] 
JOHN AND MARY DOE, ] 
Respondents, ] 
1 APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL 
> Case No: 870476-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of Utah Supreme Court, 
Appellant Sylvester Eno-Idem, the natural father of Baby Doe, 
by and through his attorney. Merlin G. Calver, hereby submits 
the following Brief on Appeal. 
Jursidiction to hear this appeal is confered on the Court 
of Appeals by U.C.A. §78-2a-3(g). 
The is from a final Order from the Second Judicial 
District of Weber County, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde. The 
final Order being in the form of a Minute Entry based on the 
denied Motion of the natural father. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action to reverse the decision requesting a 
hearing on a petition filed by Appellant, Sylvester Eno-Idem, 
to open adoption No. 4068 in the Weber County District Court. 
On October 2, 1987f the Honorable Judge Ronald 0. Hyde entered 
an Order stating that the adoption in this matter could not be 
opened and that the adoption was final and that an evidentuary 
hearing would not be held. This appeal primary involves the 
interpretation and construction of U.C.A. §78-30-4. This case 
further involves the equitable rights of the natural father to 
his children and the best interests of the parent/child 
relationship. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Appellant in this matter, Sylvester Eno-Idem, the natural 
father, petitioned Judge Ronald 0. Hyde in the Weber County 
District Court to hold an evidentuary hearing regarding the 
propriety of the adoption of Baby Doe. Judge Hyde refused to 
have a hearing and the Decree of Adoption. This appeal arises 
from Judge Ronald 0. Hyde's Order, and the previous Decreeof 
Adoption. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have a evidentuary hearing regarding the 
adoption of Baby Doe and to have this court make an 
interpretation of U.C.A. §78-30-4 to ascertain whether the 
Appellant was properly notified of the adoption proceedings, 
and whether the best interests of the child are being met by 
the adoption standing as ordered by Judge Hyde. Also, 
Appellant question whether the best interests of the 
parent/child relationship and the equitable rights of both 
parties are being served by the adoption having gone forward 
without the natural father having been adequately notified. 
Appellant further contends that Due Process of law was denied 
him, in thatf he at no time knew that he had a child nor was he 
at any time notified that this child had been placed for 
adoption until after the adoption papers had been filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The child in question. Baby Doef was born July 18, 1986, in 
Weber Countyf State of Utah. When the child was born, the 
natural father was out of the State of Utah and was not in the 
United States of America, but was in fact in Nigera, Africa. 
Said father was not aware that there was a pregnancy, nor was 
he aware that there was a child. The natural father had 
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returned to his Country of origin for a visitf the natural 
mother was not aware of when he was to returnf the natural 
mother having been married at the time of the pregnancy and 
also at the time of the childs birth was left with a decision 
and she chose to put the child up for adoption. 
The natural mother due to medical difficulties was not 
aware of her pregnancy and in fact did not know she was 
pregnanet until she went into labor. Adding to the facts in 
this matter and those facts are facts that the Appellant feels 
are extremely important/ the father is a black man of Nigerian 
citizenship/ he is in the United States performing work and 
school duties related to his job in his Country of Nigeria. 
The mother of the child, Baby Doef is a white female, she was 
married at the time of the conception of Baby Doef but was 
astranged from her husband. Prior to the childs conception the 
natural mother and the natural father had been seeing each 
other for several months and had developed a strong bonded 
relationship. Subsequent to the childs birth and the child 
being placed for adoptionf the natural father returned to the 
State of Utah, and the natural mother and natural father at 
this point have overcome the legal difficulties of their 
relationship and have married on the 5th day of September/ 
1987. The natural father was notified of the childs birth 
subsequent to the adoption of the child/ but several months 
after the proceeding had taken place. At the time that the 
natural father was notified of the adoption/ he contacted his 
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family in Nigeria to obtain their support and he also was 
informed by someone not familiar with the law, that he had six 
months in which to contest the adoption. Prior to this six 
months period of time running the natural father contacted the 
attorney for the Respondentsf Tim Healyf and informed Mr. Healy 
that he was interested in the child and would like to see how 
the child was doing. Mr. Healy did not respond in any manner 
to the request of the natural father or the natural mother at 
that point. 
Next, the natural father retained counsel, Merlin G. 
Calver, Mr. Calver attempted to file a motion to open the 
adoption proceedings but was unable to find a case number due 
to the fact that the adoption had been sealed. Mr. Calver did 
file with the attorney for the Respondents an Objection to the 
Adoption and requested a filing number from Mr. Healy. Mr. 
Healy felt it in the best interests of his clients not to 
divulge that number. Ultimately through Order of the Court the 
adoption case number was given to Mr. Calver and on the 2nd day 
of October, 1987f a hearing regarding the propriety of the 
adoption was held. At that point, Judge Hyde made the Order 
from which the Appellant is now appealing. 
Pursuant to a Request and Motion by Attorney for 
Respondents, Sylvester Eno-Idem, the natural father, the 
natural mother and Baby Doe had HLA blood tests (attached as 
Exhibit)/ conducted and it was not controverted in these blood 
tests that Sylvester Eno-Idem was the father of Baby Doe. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATDTORAL PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. §78-30-4 CONSENT TO ADOPTION states: 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent 
of each living parent having right in relations to 
said child..." 
(3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be 
the father of an illegitimate child may claim 
rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by 
registering with the registrar of vital statistics 
in the department of health, a notice of his claim 
of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the 
best of his ability. The department of health 
shall provide forms for the purpose of registering 
the notices, and the forms shall be made available 
through the office of the county clerk in this 
State. 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth 
of the child but must be registered prior to the 
date the illegitimate child is relinquished or 
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption 
services or prior to the filing of a petition by a 
person with whom the mother has placed the child 
for adootion. The notice shall be signed by the 
registrant and shall include his name and address, 
the name and last known address of the motherf and 
either the birthdate of the child or the probable 
month and year of the expected birth of the child. 
The department of health shall maintain a 
confidential registry for this purpose. 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and 
register his notice of claim to parternity and his 
agreement to support the child shall be barred from 
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to 
establish his paternity of the child. Such failure 
shall further constitute an abandonment of said 
child and a waiver and surrender of any right to 
notice of or to a hearing in any judicial 
proceeding for the adoption of said childf and the 
consent of such father to the adoption of such 
child shall not be required. 
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an 
illegitimate childf if there is no showing that the 
father has consented to the proposed adoption, it 
shall be necessary to file with the court prior to 
the granting of a decree allowing the adoption a 
certificate from the department of healthf signed 
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by the state registrar of vital statistics which 
certificate shall state that a diligent search has 
been made of the registry of notices from fathers 
of illegitimate children and that no registration 
has been found pertaining to the father of the 
illegitimate child in question* 
ARGUMENT 
There are several cases in the Utah Courts that have now 
addressed the issue of U.C.A. §78-30-4. Some of the most 
recent being Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, LPS, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980) 
That court stated that "When it is impossible for the putitive 
father to file the required notice of paternity within the time 
limits of this section, through no fault of his ownf due 
process requires that he be permitted to show that he was not 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the filing 
requirement of this section: If the father is successful in 
showing that the termination of his parental rights was 
contrary to basic notions and due process, and that he came 
forward within a reasonable time after the babies birth to file 
a notice of paternityf father should be deemed to have complied 
with this sections filing requirements.." Appellant contends 
that it was through no fault of his own that he was not 
notified prior to the child being placed for adoption or prior 
to the adoption proceedings beginning. The natural mother 
having stated and the natural father having agreed that he had 
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no knowledge as to the mothers pregnancy and that in fact the 
mother had no knowledge as to her pregnancy. That the mother 
had belief that she was unable to have children and did not 
know that she was pregnant and thought that she was having some 
type of stomach cramps or problems. The mother did not know 
she was pregnant until days before the child was born. At that 
point she was not residing with her husband and the natural 
fathers whereabouts was unknown due to his having returned to 
Nigeria for a short time. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The case under appeal was an adoption action. This appeal 
primarily involves the interpretation and construction of 
U.C.A. §78-30-4. It also involves the Equitable Right of the 
Natural father to his children and the best interests of the 
parent and child relationship. 
ARGUMENT 
The interesting point that the natural father wishes to 
bring out and the point of contention in the entire appeal is 
that the father at no time could have complied with the notice 
requirements established by U.CfA. §78-30-4. The father was 
not residing in the State of Utah or the United States at the 
time the child was born nor was the natural father aware that 
the child was born. The child was immediately placed for 
adoption, in fact the natural mother relinquished the child to 
the adoptive parents at the hospital immediately after the child 
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was born. It is assumed/ but not known because the file has 
not been opened, that within hours or days of the 
relinquishment the petition for adoption was filed. At that 
point the natural fathers rights to contest the adoption based 
on the statute would have been void. At subsequent hearings, 
the Respondents have argued that the natural father waited 
several weeks after he was informed of the adoption proceeding 
and that he should be barred from exercising his rights and 
asking to have the adoption opened based upon his failure to 
act diligently. Howeverf Appellants would anticipate that had 
the natural father immediately filed the notice of objection to 
adoption that the Respondents would have then argued that the 
natural father would have been barred from bringing an action 
because he did not file an notice of paternity prior to the 
child being placed with the adoptive parents and prior to the 
adoption proceeding being filed. In the case of K.B.E. and 
T.M.E., minor children in the Utah Court of Appeals 60 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 55 (6/29/87) Judges Greenwood, Davidson and Jackson 
heard a matter involving the timelyness and the time factors of 
the acknowledgement of paternity pursuant to U.C.A. §78-30-4, 
the court cited four cases dealing specifically with this 
statute In Re: Adoption Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, (Utah 
1986); Wells v. Childrens Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 
1984); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 
1984); Ellis v. Social Services Departmant, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1980) . These cases each involve cases where an unwed father 
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filed an acknowledgement of paternity after the child had 
either been relinquished to an agency for adoption or a 
petition to adopt had been filed. The court found the statute 
constitutional on its face. Howeverf the Utah Supreme Court 
remanded two of the cases for evidentuary hearings. (The Court 
finding that the statute violated due process as applied.) 
That being the Ellis casef and In re; Baby Boy Doe case. 
In both of these cases the court found that "although it was 
not absolutely impossible for the father to have filed an 
acknowledgement of paternity that the circumstances justify 
remand for a evidentuary hearing". The Utah Court of Appeals 
in K.B.E. and T.M.E., minor childreny tried to distinguish as 
best it could the fact of a step father adoption or a total 
relinquishment. In the instant case there is a total 
relinquishmentf therefore the Appellant is being absolutely 
barred and forever denied knowledge of, or access to his minor 
child. Further, the natural father in this case did not have 
any knowledge until months after the child has been placed for 
adoption and filed what he thought was a timely objection to 
the adoption. More recently, and in fact the most recent case 
that the court has heard regarding adoption is in the matter of 
the adoption of K.O.f aka A.D.f a minor vs. Helen Dennison, 74 
Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (1/21/88) In this matter the court decided 
that a natural grandmother, based on various reasonsf had a 
right to be notified of the intended adoption of her grandchild 
and the court in this matter remanded the case back to the 
District Court for a hearing. It would appear than the rights 
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of the natural father would be more important that the rights 
of a grandmother. The natural father in this matter asserts 
that due process was denied him in that he never was notified 
until it would have been to late in any case. 
Equity in this matter has not been reached in that Baby Doe 
is a child of mixed parentage and the natural father has reason 
to believe the adoptive parents are of a white caucasion 
family. Also taking into consideration the mixed parentage of 
the child the natural father questions whether it would be in 
the best interests of the child (in that the bests interests 
are always a consideration for this court and any other court) 
for the child to be placed in the adoption proceedings as it 
has been placed. The natural father further argues that had he 
been notified and appeared in court that the adoption would not 
have been granted based upon his assertion of his parental 
rights and based upon the mixed parentage question. 
The most important factor that the court should consider in 
this appeal/ Appellant believes, is the factor of whether or 
not it would have been possible for the natural father to have 
filed a notice of paternity pursuant to U.C.A. §78-30-4(3). 
Had it been possible then the Respondents may well have a valid 
argument that the natural father should be barred and that the 
State has an interest in speedly concluding adoptions. However 
even in the pleadings in the District Court filed by the 
Respondents, they have stated, that it was impossible for the 
father to file timley according to U.C.A. §78-30-4(3) and 
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further that the adoption proceedings had already gone forward 
and the child had been placed before the natural obtained 
knowledge of the adoption proceedings. If this court finds 
that it was impossible for the father to file, then the court 
should apply the Baby Doe standards and the Ellis standards and 
remand this matter back for an evidentuary hearing. 
As discussed in the Utah Lawyer Alert Vol. 87 #4 THE 
ADOPTION CONUNDRUM, Part 1 by Professor Lynn D. Wardle the due 
process analysis in Baby Boy Doe is intriguing. "The case 
illustrates why the requirements of due process of law cannot 
be reduced to a mechanical formula. Justice Durhams majority 
opinion in Baby Boy Doe demonstrates a special sensitivity to 
individual fairness and practical justice. Justice Stewarts 
decending opinion reveals a remarkable perceptive understanding 
of the systomatic principles of due process of law. Justice 
Stewart is concerned that hard cases make for bad law. Justice 
Durham is concerned that hard law makes for bad cases..." 
Professor Wardle goes on further to then discuss the Ellis case 
which he feels is the seminal case involving this question 
quoting the Ellis case as follows, "in the usual case, the 
putitive father would either know or reasonably should know 
when and where his child was born. It is conceivable, however 
that a situation may arise when it is impossible for the father 
to file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory 
bar, through no fault of his own. In such case due process 
require that he be permitted to show that he was not afforded a 
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reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute." Both of 
the Ellis and the Baby Doe cases discuss the "through no fault 
of his own" question. In this instant case it is easy to see 
from the pleadings and the Appellant feels the facts are 
uncontroverted that "through no fault of his own" he did not 
file or meet the statutory requirements. Thereforef when he 
did file the time period becomes irrelevant the only factor 
that is relevant was did the father know or could he have known 
prior to the adoption proceedings beginning and prior to the 
child being placed. 
U.C.A §78-30-14(4) provides that "...no petition for 
adoption shall be granted until the child shall have lived for 
six months in the home of the adopting parents..." The 
Appellant in this circumstance was under an impression that he 
had six months in which to object to the adoption. The 
Appellant is further in a quandary as to how the two statutes 
shall apply. U.C.A. §78-30-4(3) requires that a natural father 
of an illigitimate child shall file his notice of paternity 
prior to the child being placed for adoption or before the 
adoption petition being filed. However, U.C.A. §78-30-14(4) 
allows for basically a six month waiting period before the 
adoption becomes final. Your Appellant questions what the six 
month waiting period is for. If the six month waiting period 
is to insure due process and fairness and equity under the law 
and to protect the rights of the child placed for adoption then 
your Appellant and feels affirmatively states that his 
objection to adoption and his notice of paternity was filed 
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timely* If the statute requiring the six month period of time 
is for any other reason then your Appellant cannot grasp what 
that reason would be. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant affirmatively states in this matter that he 
was not afforded due process of law in that he was not notified 
nor did he have the ability to be notified that his natural 
child was being placed for adoption and that in fact it was 
impossible for him to be notified. When the Appellant returned 
to the United States and had been notified that a child had 
been born and placed for adoption at that pointf according to 
the statute, it would have been too late for him to assert his 
parental rights. However, based on equity and based on U.C.A. 
§78-30-14 your Appellant ascerts that he timely filed his 
objection and that it then falls into the District Court to 
decide if it is in the best interests of the child and the 
father that the adoption continue as is. Therefore/ the 
Appellant requests that the decision of Judge Ronald 0. Hyde be 
reversed and this matter be remanded back to the District Court 
for a full evidentuary hearing and that all of the aspects of 
this matter be taken into consideration including the biracial 
heritage of the minor child Baby Doe. 
DATED this // day of ^ W ^ K , 1988. 
Merlin G. Calver 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on this day of March, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was 
mailed, postage prepaid to Tim Healy, 863 25th Street, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, Attorney for Respondent. 
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Merlin G. Calver, Esq. #0549 
Attorney for Appellant 
290 25th Street Suite 204 
Creston Plaza 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 621-2911 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN RE: BABY DOE, ] 
SYLVESTER ENO-IDEM, ) 
Appellant, ) 
vs. ] 
JOHN AND MARY DOE, ] 
Respondents, ] 
> AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF FACTS 
1 Case No: 870476-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
Comes now the above named Appellant, Sylvester Eno-Xdem, 
and swears and deposes under oath as follows: 
1. That my name is Sylvester Daniel Eno-Idem that I reside 
at 492 14th Street Unit D-17, Ogden, Utah 84404. 
2. That I am a citizen of the Country of Nigeria. 
3. That on or about the 16th day of March, 1985, I had 
occasion to make the aquaintance of the natural mother of Baby! 
Doe. 
4. That subsequent to making her acquaintance we saw each 
other in a love affair for approximately eight months. And 
then pursuant to my employment and my furtherenance of my| 
education I was called home to my Country of Nigeria. 
W.4 
5. That during the period of time that I was residing in 
Nigeria I did not contact the natural mother of Baby Doe nor 
did I inform her of my address or my telephone number of any 
way to contact me. 
6. That when I left the State of Utah I knew full well that 
I would return and that I intended that time to renew my 
relationship with the natural mother of Baby Doe. 
7. That upon my return to the State of Utah, approximately 
the 21st day of November, 1986. I was informed by the natural 
mother that I had fathered a child and that she had placed that 
child for adoption. 
8. That subsequent to my conversation with the natural 
mother of Baby Doe regarding the birth of Baby Doe, I inquirred 
into the well being and the situation that Baby Doe had been 
placed. At my request, the natural mother sent a letter to Tim 
Healy requesting that I be allowed to see the child. 
9. That at all times after my knowledge of the birth of 
Baby Doe, I was concerned and worried and wished to have the 
baby in my possession. 
10. That I was informed that there was a six month waiting 
period before an adoption became final and I felt that I had 
time in which to examine the avenues of which to pursue to have 
the baby to have custody. 
11. That I contacted my family in Nigeria to see if I could 
have their financial support regarding Baby Doe and based upon 
the political and economical unrest in Nigeria it took several 
weeks for the communication to be responded to me. 
12. That upon my family informing me that they wish to 
support me for my quest for Baby Doe financially and 
spiritually, I then filed an acknowledgement of paternity. 
13. That subsequent to filing the acknowledgement of 
paternity I then contacted attorney Merlin G. Calver, at which 
time Mr. Calver informed me of my legal rights and problems 
with this matter. At my request, Mr. Calver then prepared an 
objection to the adoption. 
14. That subsequent to the filing of the notice of 
objection, I have married the natural mother and that marriage 
took place in the City of Elko, County of Washoe, on the 5th 
day of September, 1987. 
DATED this <M& day of JJSI^A . 1988. 
S y l v e s t e r D^Eno-Idem 
Appe l lan t 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '^ day of ))\'i \,%'.V 
1988. . 
?l\<^\0>\ Notary Public,,, j
 M/_ 
My Commission Expires: 1,i D ' lL - Residing in:''/^'' '• 
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